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Reverse tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a common 
phenomenon. Yet, it does not fit existing theoretical models of sharecropping and has never before 
been modeled in the development microeconomics literature. We explain reverse tenancy 
contracts using an asset risk model that incorporates moral hazard. When choosing the terms of an 
agrarian contract, the landlord considers the impact of her choice on the probability that she will 
retain future rights to the rented land. Thus, this model captures the effect of tenure insecurity and 
property rights on agrarian contracts. The main testable implication of the theoretical model is 
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Sharecropping, an agrarian contract by which a landlord leases out land to a tenant in 
exchange for a share of the crop, has long been studied by social scientists in general and 
by economists in particular. The canonical explanation for the existence of 
sharecropping, following Cheung (1969) and Stiglitz (1974), is that share tenancy 
matches a relatively richer landlord in a better position to absorb production risk with a 
tenant who, as a residual claimant on the output, has the proper incentives not to shirk. 
Sharecropping could thereby dominate both fixed rent contracts that were considered too 
risky by the tenant and wage contracts that would predictably lead to underprovision of 
effort by the tenant. 
 
Of course, not every sharecropping contract fits the above stylized facts. We are 
especially interested in situations of “reverse tenancy”, in which a relatively poorer 
landlord contracts with a relatively richer tenant. These situations do not fit the canonical 
model of sharecropping because the poorer landlord no longer holds comparative 
advantage in risk bearing over the tenant. None of the extant published models of 
sharecropping are consistent with the oft-observed phenomenon of reverse tenancy. 
 
In this paper, we present a theoretical model of reverse tenancy as it is being practiced in 
Madagascar. Since the poorer landlord can neither sell her land nor exploit it herself, she VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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rents out to a richer tenant on a share tenancy contract. We hypothesize that imperfectly 
secure land rights motivate reverse tenancy.  As under the canonical sharecropping 
model,  if the landlord were to hire the tenant on a wage labor contract, moral hazard 
would lead to labor shirking.  The innovation we introduce is that if the landlord were to 
rent out her land on a fixed rent contract, she would face an increased probability of 
losing her claim on the land. In much of rural Madagascar, local custom holds that taking 
possession of the fruits of the land ensures continued access to the land, much as direct 
cultivation of the land does under more traditional Lockean property rights.  Under such 
conditions, the incentive to reduce asset risk motivates reverse tenancy sharecropping, 
replacing the traditional incentive that arises due to the landlord’s superior capacity to 
bear yield risk. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section II, we briefly review the 
literatures on sharecropping and on reverse tenancy.  Section III, develops the theoretical 
model and presents the main results.  In section IV, we discuss our model in relation to 
property rights in Madagascar.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
A) THE LITERATURE ON SHARECROPPING 
The sharecropping literature dates back to Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776, 1957), who observed that share tenancy was an 
unsatisfactory arrangement between slavery and the English (or fixed rent) system, that 
tenants had virtually no incentive to make improvements to the land under a VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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sharecropping contract, and that issues of moral hazard were likely to arise. It then took 
close to a century and a half for economists to “discover” sharecropping again. Marshall 
(1920), in the eighth and last edition of his Principles of Economics, applied a rigorous, 
diagrammatic, marginal analysis to the phenomenon and concluded that, given the 
prohibitive cost to the landlord of enforcing the tenant’s effort, tenants will equate the 
marginal product of their labor to the marginal income they get from their share of the 
crop. Thus, Marshall argued that the landlord could do strictly better by signing a fixed 
rent contract by which she extracts the entire surplus. This kind of moral hazard is 
sometimes referred to as “Marshallian inefficiency”. 
 
Cheung (1968) noted that the tenant’s surplus observed in a Marshallian equilibrium was 
inconsistent with the notion of a competitive equilibrium. He thus took a different view, 
assuming that the tenant’s effort was costlessly enforceable. He also assumed that 
landlords choose the number of tenants with whom they contract, which allows the 
former to bind the latter to their reservation utility. Cheung (1969) then discussed without 
much formalism that, in p resence of both agricultural risk and transaction costs, 
sharecropping might emerge as the dominant tenurial arrangement. 
 
Stiglitz (1974) picks up where Cheung (1969) had left off by focusing on risk-sharing and 
the incentive effects of sharecropping. By exploring in turn what happens when the labor 
supply is inelastic and when the labor supply can vary, he obtains a series of results, two 
of which are striking: (i) under certain circumstances, i.e., when both parties can “mix” 
contracts, sharecropping becomes redundant; and (ii) under other, particular VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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circumstances, effort will not be underprovided, i.e., there is no Marshallian inefficiency, 
and sharecropping contracts are efficient. 
 
Newbery’s (1977) contribution takes Stiglitz (1974) a step further by focusing solely on 
the risk-sharing effects of sharecropping contracts. He demonstrates that sharecropping is 
irrelevant when agricultural risk is the only risk that exists, but that when another type of 
risk enters the picture (a plausible assumption as r egards agriculture in developing 
countries), sharecropping becomes the dominant tenurial arrangement. Our model 
follows in the spirit of Newbery by introducing multiple sources of risk, in our case asset 
risk in addition to production yield risk. 
 
The above key references, like the rest of the economic theoretic literature on 
sharecropping, cannot explain the emergence of reverse tenancy. Assuming agents do not 
exhibit increasing absolute risk-aversion, the conjectured dominance of sharecropping 
depends fundamentally on a relatively rich landlord who has a comparative advantage in 
risk-bearing or credit access and a relatively poorer tenant who has a comparative 
advantage in labor supervision due to moral hazard. Based on this, the economic theoretic 
literature on sharecropping inherently fails to explain reverse tenancy.
1  
 
B) THE LITERATURE ON REVERSE TENANCY 
The literature on reverse tenancy is small and purely empirical, consisting almost solely 
of case studies. Lawry (1993) presents a case study of land tenure in Lesotho, Lyne and 
                                                                 
1  The reader interested in more complete reviews of the literature on sharecropping can consult Singh 
(1989) and Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami (1992). VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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Thomson (1995) review land use in KwaZulu, South Africa, and Colin and Bouquet 
(2001) discuss the a medias (or fifty-fifty) arrangement in the Mexican Sierra Madre. 
There is likewise scattered evidence that the phenomenon of reverse tenancy is on the rise 
in India (most notably Punjab and Haryana
2, but also in West Bengal) and in the 
Philippines (Roumasset, 2002).  Two focal points seem to emerge of Lawry (1993) and 
Lyne and Thomson (1995): landlord households are typically headed by a single, older 
woman, i.e., a woman that is either divorced or widowed, and tenant households are 
typically headed by a younger man
3. But none of these studies provide a sound 
theoretical model for or any econometric analysis of the reverse tenancy phenomenon.  
All of them are merely descriptive in nature. 
 
Given the seeming frequency with which reverse tenancy occurs and the absence of any 
clear theory to explain its existence, there seems to be value in providing a theoretical 
model of reverse tenancy in order that agrarian policy on a reasonably common 
phenomenon might be founded on a clear understanding of the reason for the institution’s 
existence.  Such an understanding is essential if policymakers are to anticipate correctly 
how changes in key exogenous parameters, such as the legality of share contracts, access 
to rural credit, or security of land tenure, are likely responses to affect agricultural 
production and the welfare of poorer farmers. 
 
Our work is motivated by field observations in Madagascar, where sharecropping was 
been declared illegal in the early 1970s based on the perception that it led to agreements 
                                                                 
2 India’s Economic and Political Weekly has mentioned this a few times. We thank Kei Otsuka for pointing 
this out. 
3 The same focal points seem to be true in India. We thank Clive Bell for pointing this out. VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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between relatively rich landlords and relatively poor tenants, and that this in turn could 
lead to exploitation in the context of what Breman (1974) refers to as a patron-client 
relationship. Sharecropping nonetheless continues in Madagascar, comprising more than 
half of all land rentals, according to the most recent available data (Minten and 
Razafindraibe 2003). Moreover, anecdotal evidence and our own visits to numerous 
small farms in rural Madagascar confirm the presence of reverse tenancy and limited 
survey evidence suggests that landlords are, on average, less educated, poorer and more 
likely female than tenants. Jarosz (1991) notes that “(...) sharecroppers are not solely 
landless or nearly landless peasants; members of the wealthy and middle classes also 
sharecrop the land of others. These landowners are generally smallholders, poor or 
middle-class farmers who are indebted, elderly, female or the descendants of formers 
slaves”. Jarosz also notes how people who enter sharecropping agreements are mostly 
married women who have inherited land near their ancestral villages and then have 
moved away to live near their husbands’ village, divorced women, widows, etc. She also 
adds that poor landlords who own land will have middle-income or rich farmers as 
tenants, or even urban people. This is because landlords typically lack the financial or 
physical capital to cultivate their land themselves. 
 
The theory that follows is thus motivated by the reasonably widespread practice of 
reverse tenancy in a nation where the overwhelming majority of the poor are small 
farmers, the poor systematically have weaker property rights in land than the rich 
(Randrianarisoa and Minten 2001, Minten and Razafindraibe 2003), and stimulating 
agricultural productivity is universally recognized as crucial to poverty reduction.  One VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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needs a coherent theory of the phenomenon in order to answer practical policy questions 
such as whether a ban on share tenancy is relevant, what are the likely consequences of 
land tenure changes, and how might the welfare of poor land-owning households be 
increased?  
 
III. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Let  t h  denote the landlord’s land holding at time t,  ] 1 , 0 [ e a - ˛  be the share of the crop 
that goes to the landlord as part of the sharecropping agreement,  0 ‡ b  be a side payment 
from the richer tenant to the poorer landlord, and  ) 1 , 0 ( ˛ d  be the landlord’s discount 
factor.
4 We assume  1 = a  to be impossible, which is equivalent to assuming that the 
landlord cannot borrow in order to become an owner-operator and hire tenants – wage 
laborers – at a fixed wage. This is equivalent to assuming a fragmented credit market. In 
this setting, we want to know when a poorer land owner will rent out her land to a richer 
tenant on shares instead of a fixed rent contract. Further, we assume that the landlord 
cannot sell her land. This is empirically motivated by the fact that very often in 
Madagascar, one’s ancestors are buried on one’s land, and that this makes the landlord’s 
marginal willingness to accept money in exchange for her land strictly greater than what 
her land could fetch on the market. That is, the presence of a landlord’s ancestors on her 
land creates a psychic value of the land to the landlord which she would have to obtain 
over and above the market price in order to sell her land.  Land sales are consequently 
uncommon and assumed away in this analysis.
5  
                                                                 
4 The parameter e is a (potentially very small) positive number in the (0,1) interval included for purely 
technical reasons to bound the results.  It is ignored hereafter. 
5 Note that we do not assume here that the market for land is fragmented. VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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Thus said, as regards land, we make 
 
ASSUMPTION 1:   Let the expected law of motion for land be such that 
t t h h E ) ( ) ( 1 a r = + . 
           
In Assumption 1, the function  ) (a r  is an asset security parameter. Equivalently, 
) ( 1 a r -  is the risk of asset loss due to tenure insecurity in the land. Small farmers in 
several different sites in rural Madagascar have told us over the past decade that if their 
claim to a parcel of land is at all insecure, in the sense that it could be repossessed by the 
community and given to a different farmer, then their customary claim to the land is 
enhanced if they are observed to receive and retain part of the crop from the parcel. This 
seems to reflect either some sense of the household’s dependence on the parcel for its 
food security – and communities are loathe to damage members’ food security – or a 
quasi-Lockean property right, wherein receiving the fruit of the land is treated similarly 
to working it directly.  The origin and motive of this perception are not the object of our 
study. We take these as given. We therefore make: 
 
ASSUMPTION 2:  Let  0 ) ( ' > a r , i.e., asset security (risk) is strictly increasing 
(decreasing) in the share of the output received as rent. 
 
We then make 
 VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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ASSUMPTION 3:  Let the landlord’s utility function  ) ( t u p  be a bounded, strictly 
increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable 
function of profit at time t,  t p .  
 
The concavity assumption implies that the landlord is risk-averse. The sharecropping 
literature typically assumes that the landlord is risk-neutral and the tenant risk-averse. 
Given that the landlord is poorer than her tenant in situations of reverse tenancy, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the landlord is indeed risk-averse. 
 
The landlord’s profit at time t is a function of land, such that: 
 
] ) , , ( [ ) ( t t t t t t t c h k f u u - + = b a p l ,            (3) 
 
where  ) , , ( t t t h k f l  is the agricultural output as a function of capital, labor and land at 
time t, respectively, such that  0 ) ( ' > ￿ f ,  0 ) ( " < ￿ f  and  ) (￿ f  is bounded. The parameter 
t b  is the side payment – the fixed rent if it is positive or, if negative, a cash wage– from 
the tenant to the landlord; and  0 ‡ t c  subsumes the various costs borne by the landlord. 
For simplicity, we assume that the landlord possesses no input other than land, i.e., the 
tenant possesses both capital and labor inputs, as seems typical from the extant literature. 
In order for the reverse tenancy sharecropping contract to be individually rational, the VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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landlord must derive non-negative profit from the agreement. Further, in order to account 
for moral hazard
6, we make 
 
ASSUMPTION 4:  Let  ) ( t t a l l = , where  0 ) ( ' < ￿ l  and  0 ) ( " > ￿ l . That is, there is 
Marshallian inefficiency. 
 
Note that for simplicity, we only assume traditional moral hazard instead of assuming 
both traditional and technical moral hazard.
7 This does not make much difference, as our 
main results would only be strengthened by assuming both traditional and technical moral 
hazard. 
 















    s.t.  t t h h E ) ( ) ( 1 a r = +  and  0 0 > h  given.  (4) 
 
The Bellman equation for equation (4), or its dynamic programming version, is such that: 
 
{ } ) ' ( ) ( max ) ( h EV u h V d p + =    s.t.  h h E ) ( ) ' ( a r =  and  0 > h  given.   (5) 
                                                                 
6 Sadoulet, de Janvry and Fukui (1997) find that moral hazard plays much less of a role in kin contracts 
than in non-kin contracts. There is survey evidence that as much as 40 percent of sharecropping contracts 
are kin-based in Madagascar, and we intend to test for this in our upcoming research. Finding strong 
evidence that moral hazard indeed has no effect in kin-based sharecropping agreements would point to the 
need for a different theoretical model, or a different formulation of the present one.  
7 Traditional moral hazard refers to situations where the agent underprovides labor or, more generally, 
effort. Technical moral hazard refers to situations where the agent underprovides capital or chooses a 
production technique which is not optimal from the principal’s point of view.  VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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We drop the subscript in equation (5) given that the sequential problem is reduced to only 
two periods – now and tomorrow – by the principle of optimality. Thus, h denotes the 
landlord’s land now and  ' h  denotes the landlord’s land in the future. 
 
Let us now assume that the landlord’s utility function – or returns function, in dynamic 
programming terms – takes the canonical DARA/CRRA form:  
 
ASSUMPTION 5:  Let  ] ) ), ( , ( ln[ ln ) ( t t t t t t t t c h k f u - + = = b a a p p l . 
 
Given that the landlord’s profit is bounded by assumption,
8 the function  ) (￿ u  is also 
bounded, and it is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously 
differentiable. Thus, the landlord’s dynamic programming problem is: 
 
{ } ) ' ( ] ) ), ( , ( ln[ max ) (
,
h EV c h k f h V d b a a
b a
+ - + = l   
s.t.  h h E ) ( ) ' ( a r = ,  0 > h .  (6) 
 
At this point, n ote that because  b  enters the landlord’s profit linearly, by strict 
monotonicity of her preferences, she will always set  b  at the highest possible value, 
while still satisfying the tenant’s individual rationality constraint, which we omit here in 
the interest of brevity.
9 Thus, we make: 
                                                                 
8 Assuming that the agricultural output is bounded, then the landlord’s profit is bounded. 
9 We use a principal-agent formulation here for the sake of simplicity and consistency with the extant 
sharecropping literature. As Bell (1989) notes, it is likely that tenants also enjoy welfare gains from 
sharecropping contracts. The intuition and qualitative results of our model carry over to the more complex 
bargaining theoretic framework necessary to derive mutual gains from sharecropping VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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ASSUMPTION 6:  Let  ) (a b b = , where  0 ) ( ' < ￿ b  and  ) ), ( , ( ) ( ' h k f a a b l < . That 
is, the rent paid to the landlord is a strictly decreasing function of 
the share of the crop and never exceeds the value of the crop. 
 
Then, the problem can be reduced to: 
 
{ } ) ' ( ] ) ( ) ), ( , ( ln[ max ) ( h EV c h k f h V d a b a a
a + - + = l   
s.t.  h h E ) ( ) ' ( a r = ,  0 > h .  (7) 
 
The first-order condition for equation (7) implies that under the optimal contract: 
 
h h EV
c h k f
h k f h k f
) ( ' ) ' ( '
) ( ) ), ( , (
) ( ' ) ( ' ) ), ( , ( ) ), ( , ( *
* * *
* * * ' * *
a r d
a b a a






  (8) 
 
In light of the assumptions we have made thus far, the value function is strictly 
increasing. Consequently,  the value of owning a plot of size  h for a landlord who 
behaves optimally from now on is strictly increasing in the amount of land owned. More 
importantly, it establishes that the right-hand side of equation (8) is strictly negative. 
Further, equation (8) immediately allows us to state the following: 
 
 VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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PROPOSITION 1:  Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, sharecropping emerges as 
the optimal contract. That is,  0
* > a  and  ) (
* a b b =  is set so as to 
maximize the landlord’s profit from the contract while maintaining 
the tenant at his reservation level of utility.  
 




) 0 ( ' ) ' ( '
) 0 (














- ) 0 (
) 0 ( ' ) ' ( '






But then, the left-hand since of this last equation is negative given the latter part of 
Assumption 6 and since  0 ) ), 0 ( , ( > h k f l   and  0 ) 0 ( ' ) ' ( ' > ￿ h h EV r d , this yields a 
contradiction since whenever  0 = a , the landlord’s profit is equal to  c - ) 0 ( b , which 
must be non-negative by individual rationality. Alternatively, evaluating the first-order 
condition at  0 = a  yields a positive value and a necessary condition for a maximum is 
that the value of the first-order condition be nonpositive. Thus, at the optimum,  0 > a . 
 
We can also state the following as regards the comparative statics of the model, which 
gives us empirically-testable implications: 
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PROPOSITION 2:  The share of the crop that goes to the landlord is strictly increasing 
in the cost borne by the landlord and strictly decreasing in the 
amount of capital provided by the tenant. Also, the output is 


















PROOF: We prove this directly using the partial derivatives of a  with respect to c and k: 
0
) ( ' ) ), ( , ( ' ) ( ' ) ' ( ' ) ), ( , (






a a a r d a
a r d a
l l l h k f h h EV h k f
h h EV
c
      (9) 
0
)] ( ' ) ), ( , ( ' ) ( ' ) ' ( ' ) ), ( , ( [







a a a r d a
a a a r d a a a
l l l
l l l l
h k f h h EV h k f
h k f h h EV h k f h k f
k
  (10) 
 
While the sign of equation (10) is unambiguous, the denominator of equation (9) is of 
ambiguous sign given that its second term is negative. But then, the second term 
multiplies two marginal effects, i.e. its value will be very small compared to the first term. 
Thus, equation (9) is positive. Finally,  





l l h k f
f
 .              (11) 
 
This model hinges on the existence of insecure land rights.   This implies that tenure 
security will affect the existence of reverse tenancy contracts.  This leads to 
 VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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PROPOSITION 3:  As property rights become secure, the landlord will switch from a 
reverse tenancy agreement to a fixed rent contract. That is, when 
1 ) ( = a r ,  0 = a . 
 
PROOF: This is simply a Newbery-type result: when there exists only one type of risk, in 
this case moral hazard, then sharecropping agreements become irrelevant. To see this, 
note that if  1 ) ( = a r , then a risk-averse landlord does strictly better by leaving all of the 
crop to the tenant and extracting the whole surplus by setting  ) 0 ( ) ( b a b =  at the value 
which will maximize her profit while maintaining the tenant at his reservation level of 
utility. 
 
In sum, Proposition 1 establishes the emergence of reverse tenancy, i.e., that 
sharecropping between a poorer landlord and a richer tenant can emerges as the dominant 
tenurial arrangement. Proposition 2 provides the main empirically testable implications of 
our theoretical model in the presence of cross-sectional data among a population 
characterized by reverse tenancy sharecropping. Proposition 3 establishes that as property 
rights get stronger, reverse tenancy sharecropping tends to disappear, providing a key 
empirically testable proposition that will require longitudinal data for proper testing. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Given the model of the preceding section, it appears that reverse tenancy sharecropping 
contracts, which are still illegal in Madagascar, emerge from the joint presence of asset 
risk and moral hazard.  In so far as sharecropping’s illegality impedes reverse tenancy VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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contracting, the legal restriction therefore injures poor, landed households by inducing 
them to choose a suboptimal form of contracting out their land.  Furthermore, as property 
rights become more secure, reverse tenancy sharecropping will tend to disappear, with 
poorer land owners benefiting from reduced Marshallian inefficiency as a result of 
endogenously changing agrarian contracts. Thus, there seems to be a good reason for the 
State to address the issues of sharecropping, titling and property rights enforcement. 
 
The relevance of property rights questions is made greater by empirical evidence that 
poor landowners may be most affected by insecure property rights. To wit, 
Randrianarisoa and Minten (2001) mention that in 1993, although 31% of owned land 
was reported as titled, the breakdown in income quintiles indicated that this percentage 
was equal to 32% for the richest quintile but was only equal to 20% for the poorest 
quintile. Minten and Razafindraibe (2003) note that this inequity becomes more acute 
when one looks at gender differences, with land more than three times more likely to be 
titled in a man’s name than in a woman’s.  Poor and female landowners thus appear to be 
the ones whose property rights are the weakest, and so they are the ones who could most 
benefit from a strengthening of property rights. Randrianarisoa and Minten (2001) also 
mention that “while an improvement of secure property rights that can be established in a 
cheap way might benefit agricultural productivity and efficiency in some regional 
settings, increasing attention should be paid to include the poor in this titling process. It is 
shown that the rich hold relatively more secure titles to land than do the poor and some 
studies have shown that the rich might even get titles to the detriment of the poor.” 
 VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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In this sense, if property rights are endogenous, as we have argued, an effort should be 
made to make them exogenous. Besley (1995), studying the link between land rights and 
individual investment decisions in Ghana, similarly argued that property rights could be 
endogenous  but he concluded that one should not necessarily see developing land rights 
as a universal panacea. Platteau (1996) also argues that the beneficial effects of 
establishing private property rights are overestimated, and that it would be better to rely 
on informal mechanisms at the community level. Our model, however, introduces the 
important possibility of endogenous change in the form of contract governing agricultural 
production.  In this setting, it appears that establishing such rights may well improve the 
situation of poor but landed households. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces a theory to explain the existence of reverse tenancy, i.e., 
sharecropping agreements in w hich the landlord is poorer than the tenant. Reverse 
tenancy has been widely reported in the empirical literature, but no theoretical 
explanation of its origins has been advanced to date.  Using a dynamic argument which 
combines the risk of asset loss with Marshallian inefficiency associated with labor 
shirking by an imperfectly supervised tenant, we establish that sharecropping contracts 
will be chosen by the poorer landlord and derive comparative statics that are consistent 
with the stylized facts of reverse tenancy sharecropping.  Our model also implies that 
reverse tenancy will tend to disappear as property rights get stronger. First, the State 
should make sharecropping contracts legal, for even though the ban on share tenancy is 
not strictly enforced, it still creates some uncertainty for the households that are party to VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
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such agreements. Second, the State should address the question of land rights for all land 
owners, perhaps especially the poor. 
 
While this model explains the stylized facts well enough, there is still much to be done on 
reverse tenancy. For one, our model should be taken to data and tested against other  
plausible explanations for the existence of reverse tenancy. For example, Bellemare 
(2003) offers a preliminary model of reverse tenancy based on limited liability. Given 
apparent widespread practice of reverse tenancy in different legal, political and economic 
environments, a general explanation of this phenomenon based on sound theory and 
empirical validation should be sought.   VERY ROUGH FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
  20 
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